Appears to give the first model-theoretic account of both "must" and "ought" (without conflating them with one another). Some key pre-theoretic semantic and pragmatic phenomena that support a negative answer to the main title question are identified and a conclusion of some significance is drawn: a pervasive bipartisan presupposition of twentieth century ethical theory and deontic logic is false. Next, an intuitive model-theoretic framework for "must" and "ought" is hypothesized. It is then shown how this hypothesis helps to explain and (...) predict all the pre-theoretic phenomena previously observed. Next, I show that the framework hypothesized possesses additional expressive and explanatory power (e.g. derivatively predicting the existence of supererogatory and permissibly suboptimal alternatives), thus adding further confirmation that it is on the right track. (shrink)

Anti-exceptionalists about logic claim that logical methodology is not different from scientific methodology when it comes to theory choice. Two anti-exceptionalist accounts of theory choice in logic are abductivism and predictivism. These accounts have in common reliance on pre-theoretical logical intuitions for the assessment of candidate logical theories. In this paper, I investigate whether intuitions can provide what abductivism and predictivism want from them and conclude that they do not. As an alternative to these approaches, I propose a Carnapian (...) view on logical theorizing according to which logical theories do not simply account for pre-theoretical intuitions, but rather improve on them. In this account, logical theories are ameliorative, rather than representational. (shrink)

People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which (...) starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis. (shrink)

Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In (...) this article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division. (shrink)

Rawls's view that the right is prior to the good has been criticized by various scholars from divergent points of view. Some contend that Rawls's teleological/deontological distinction based on the priority of the right is misleading while others claim that no plausible ethical theory can determine what is right prior to the good. There is no consensus on how to interpret the priority of right to the good; nor is there an agreement on the criteria of teleological/deontological distinction. In (...) this article, I argue that the critics' interpretations of the principle of the priority of right to the good as well as their conceptions of the teleological/deontological distinction have serious shortcomings to the extent that they ignore rich theoretical resources we find in Kant's moral and political philosophy. Kant's conception of human dignity and his division of the doctrine of virtue and the doctrine of right supply powerful arguments to clarify and sustain the idea of the priority of right to the good and the teleological/deontological division. (shrink)

People are minded creatures; we have thoughts, feelings and emotions. More intriguingly, we grasp our own mental states, and conduct the business of ascribing them to ourselves and others without instruction in formal psychology. How do we do this? And what are the dimensions of our grasp of the mental realm? In this book, Alvin I. Goldman explores these questions with the tools of philosophy, developmental psychology, social psychology and cognitive neuroscience. He refines an approach called simulation theory, which (...) starts from the familiar idea that we understand others by putting ourselves in their mental shoes. Can this intuitive idea be rendered precise in a philosophically respectable manner, without allowing simulation to collapse into theorizing? Given a suitable definition, do empirical results support the notion that minds literally create surrogates of other peoples mental states in the process of mindreading? Goldman amasses a surprising array of evidence from psychology and neuroscience that supports this hypothesis. (shrink)

In 1939, the influential psychophysicist S. S. Stevens proposed definitional distinctions between the terms ‘number,’ ‘numerosity,’ and ‘numerousness.’ Although the definitions he proposed were adopted by syeveral psychophysicists and experimental psychologists in the 1940s and 1950s, they were almost forgotten in the subsequent decades, making room for what has been described as a “terminological chaos” in the field of numerical cognition. In this paper, I review Stevens’s distinctions to help bring order to this alleged chaos and to shed light (...) on two closely related questions: whether it is adequate to speak of a number sense and how philosophers can make sense of the claim by cognitive scientists that numbers are perceptual entities. Moreover, I offer further support to Stevens’s distinction between numerosity and numerousness by showing that they are relational properties that emerge through different relationships between agents and their environments. The final conclusion is that, by adopting Stevens’s distinctions, numbers do not need to be seen as perceptual entities, since the so-called number sense is better described as a sense of numerousness. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to study interpretation, specifically, to work toward an account of interpretation that seems descriptively and explanatorily correct. No account of interpretation can be philosophically helpful, I submit, if it is incompatible with a correct account of what people actually do when they interpret others. My question, then, is: how does the (naive) interpreter arrive at his/her judgments about the mental attitudes of others? Philosophers who have addressed this question have not, in my view, (...) been sufficiently psychological, or cognitivist, even those who are otherwise psychologically inclined. I shall defend some proposals about the activity of interpretation that are, I believe, psychologically more realistic than their chief competitors. (shrink)

Our study aimed to investigate what Muslim families in England have the opportunity to have religious education for their children and to examine the institutions or structures that provide Islamic education opportunities. Document analysis as a qualitative method was adopted in our study. Academic books and articles related to the subject, statistical records, various re-ports provided by the state and private institutions, school curricula, school inspection reports, and law articles, and some court decisions constitute the main data sources. Maximum (...) diversi-ty sampling from the purposeful sampling types was used in determining the schools that were examined their Islamic curriculum, and it was tried to include as many different curriculum examples as possible. The fact that religious lessons are compulsory in schools in England and that this lesson is taught with a multicultural approach can be seen as an opportunity. On the other hand, there is a flexible education system in England. Muslim faith schools, supplementary schools (madrasa, maktab, and mosque school), and the home-schooling system are places and structures where Islamic education is carried out within the scope of formal and informal education. It is seen that Muslim faith schools are allowed to be opened as 'voluntary aided schools' by defining their distinctive religious characters as Muslim. The number of ‘state-funded Muslim schools’ is very limited, but their existence carries symbolic weight as a recognition of the Muslim com-munity’s right to establish such schools. It is understood that Muslim faith schools were opened mostly in the category of ‘independent schools’. Although there are various discussions about it, it is also important for Muslims to have informal religious education, in addition to formal education; it is allowed to open schools that offer Islamic education under the name of madrasa, maktab or mosque school. Families who send their children to the community schools because of the insufficient number of Muslim faith schools send their children to madāris (singular: madrasa), makātib (singular: maktab), or mosque schools which are called as ‘supplementary schools’. Social and moral values are taught here, including the teaching of the Qur'an, as well as sīrah (the biography of the Prophet), fiqh (jurisprudence), and Islamic history. It was understood that families who want to protect their children from the unhealthy envi-ronment of the school have the right to prefer home education, since the school is not compul-sory. In this sense, home-schooling can be considered as another opportunity for Muslim fami-lies to have their children Islamic Education. In addition to all these opportunities, the lack of a standard in these educational structures, the unqualified teachers, the inadequacy of curriculum development studies, and as a result, lack of qualified teaching materials are important problems. Economic limitations emerge as the first obstacle to increase the number of Muslim faith schools and to improve educational quali-ty. This situation threatens the quality of education by giving rise to poor buildings, insufficient resources, insufficient health and safety standards, and inexperienced management. Another threat to the quality of education is that teachers for independent schools do not have to have Qualified Teacher Status (QTS). While negative perceptions about Muslim schools have been identified as another challenge, it is expressed in various sources that Muslim students are frequently exposed to Islamophobia in various ways in public schools. Linking mosques and Islamic education institutions to radicalization and making them a subject of discussion is another noteworthy issue. Although there is no evidence of the relationship between Muslim schools and terrorist acts in England, Muslim schools are subjected to suspicions of being po-tential breeding grounds for future extremists. It seems necessary to take some actions for madrasahs who do not want to be under the con-trol of the state to reach certain standards and increase the quality of education. For example, Muslim supplementary schools should be united under the same roof of an association like The Association of Muslim Schools. This will help to attain certain standards, to increase the quality of education, and to create opportunities for various cooperation and sharing of experiences. Also, it should not be seen enough that the teachers in the madāris only have religious educa-tion, and their pedagogical competencies should be improved by subjecting them to various educational programs. (shrink)

An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that (...) α. Here the appeal might be that of forging a link between the holding of a moral belief and the acknowledgment that one has a reason for acting a certain way; and the shortcoming of the suggestion is its evident implausibility: even if the ‘necessity’ direction could be established, having a desire hardly seems sufficient for the holding of any such belief. Again: it might be proposed, perhaps simply to bring some order into the realm of propositional attitudes by reducing some to others, that the belief with which we should identify a’s desire that α is a’s belief that he will or would be happy if α. This proposed identification can be seen to be incorrect by consideration of examples such as the following, due to J. Gosling. An aging and ailing parent might forego numerous pleasures in order that his children should reap the benefits of his saving and have a good start in life – perhaps by receiving an expensive education – after his impending death. Oearly he may want that they should so benefit even if he does not believe in an after-death existence in which he might come to know of, and so take pleasure in, his children’s subsequent well-being. So his wanting that they should prosper cannot consist in his believing that he will be happy if/when they do, since he has no expectation of even being in existence in that eventuality. As Gosling puts it, there is a clear difference between thinking that something’s coming about will bring one pleasure, on the one hand, and viewing the prospect of its coming about with pleasure, on the other. (shrink)

An account of desire as a species of belief may owe its appeal to the details of its proposal as to precisely what sort of beliefs desires are to be identified with, and its downfall may be due to those details it does provide. For example, it may be proposed that the desire that α is in fact the belief that it ought to be that α, or is morally good or desirable that it should be the case that (...) α. Here the appeal might be that of forging a link between the holding of a moral belief and the acknowledgment that one has a reason for acting a certain way; and the shortcoming of the suggestion is its evident implausibility: even if the ‘necessity’ direction could be established, having a desire hardly seems sufficient for the holding of any such belief. Again: it might be proposed, perhaps simply to bring some order into the realm of propositional attitudes by reducing some to others, that the belief with which we should identify a’s desire that α is a’s belief that he will or would be happy if α. This proposed identification can be seen to be incorrect by consideration of examples such as the following, due to J. Gosling. An aging and ailing parent might forego numerous pleasures in order that his children should reap the benefits of his saving and have a good start in life – perhaps by receiving an expensive education – after his impending death. Oearly he may want that they should so benefit even if he does not believe in an after-death existence in which he might come to know of, and so take pleasure in, his children’s subsequent well-being. So his wanting that they should prosper cannot consist in his believing that he will be happy if/when they do, since he has no expectation of even being in existence in that eventuality. As Gosling puts it, there is a clear difference between thinking that something’s coming about will bring one pleasure, on the one hand, and viewing the prospect of its coming about with pleasure, on the other. (shrink)

This paper offers a sizeable menu of approaches to what it means to be an expert. Is it a matter of reputation within a community, or a matter of what one knows independently of reputation? An initial proposal characterizes expertise in dispositional terms—an ability to help other people get answers to difficult questions or execute difficult tasks. What cognitive states, however, ground these abilities? Do the grounds consist in “veritistic” states or in terms of evidence or justifiedness? (...) To what extent is expertise a matter of superior knowledge or other factors? Some authors seek to debunk the notion of expertise entirely. The present approach resists this stance, but doesn’t dispute the variability and fluidness of the concept. Even more challenging is the problem of how laypersons can determine who is the superior expert, especially when experts disagree. (shrink)

In the present study, we tried to deal with the controversial concept of Alevism. Over the years, it has drawn our attention that controversial concepts have increased remarkably in various articles and studies. Especially heterodoxy, orthodoxy, syncretism, etc. It has been seen that the main concepts come to the fore as the main discussion axis in Alevism studies. However, without knowing what these concepts are, Alevism is being dragged into completely different channels with the tendency of slogans such as (...) "Alevism is heterodoxy, Alawism is syncretism". From this point of view, the need to deal with controversial concepts that create the hidden agenda has emerged. From this point of view, we tried to deal with the main platform concepts and discussions encountered in Alevism studies. In particular, we tried to deal with the controversial concepts formed around the speculations produced by the West and that create the hidden agenda. The Ottoman Safavid rivalry attracted the attention of Europe which sought to expand its research and experience in the field. To date, incomparable literature has been produced in this field. Over time, this literature has become a reference source for modern Alevism studies. Although these studies are partially objective, the ambassadors, clerics, travelers, and researchers who wrote them could not escape the influence of the educational, cultural, and religious political perspective from which they came. This accumulation, which was transferred to the present over time, was transmitted to other generations and formed a tradition of perception. Alevism, which was condemned to vicious circles such as sectarianism, left-wing radicalism, etc., was included in the script of studies that aimed at politicization, marginalization, and conceptual distortions by separating it from the religion of Islam. But at the same time, the changes in knowledge and methods produced by each period were reflected in this literature. In this context, the research products on Alevism have formed the information infrastructure in politicization and orientation activities. This long-standing interest of the Europeans eventually allowed the emergence of new concepts and some evaluations from their own perspectives. Due to the lack of systematic theology of Alevism and its structure as a mythological theological understanding based on oral literature and traditions, no consensus could be reached on the definition. As a natural result of this, Alevism operates with the belief that it is in a race to be defined by different people and groups, and each one of them is the right one. Thus, Alevism is an emotional state where everyone can speak and even feel themselves in absolute truth. As a method, we tried to examine the leading controversial concepts with their current counterparts in a concrete way, so that they can find concrete answers in the minds of researchers. In addition, we have tried to deal with the works that set the agenda in the past and today. Thus, it will reflect the general view of the controversial concepts of Alevism. This situation of Alevism has attracted the attention of orientalist researchers (George White, Irène Mélikoff, Marcus Dressler, Hans Lucas Kieser) in the historical process, and they have shown interest in this field with political, ideological, religious, and other motives. While doing this, they preferred to use the concepts found in the history of Christianity and Judaism in the field of Alevism. These researchers have used the historical understanding and patterns of their cultures, such as Christianity and Judaism, to which they originally belonged, in interpreting Alevism. All these approaches prevent the correct perception of Alevism and lead to an environment of mental confusion and chaos. It has caused Alevism to move away from the scientific understanding it deserves. (shrink)

The following intellectual as opposed to practical reasons for all anthropologists doing fieldwork are examined: fieldwork: (1) records dying societies, (2) corrects ethnocentric bias, (3) helps put customs in their true context, (4) helps get the "feel" of a place, (5) helps to get to understand a society from the inside, (6) enables appreciation of what translating one culture into terms of another involves, (7) makes one a changed man, (8) provides the observational, factual basis for generalizations. None of (...) these is found sufficient to make fieldwork imperative for all anthropologists, although they are quite sufficient to allow that it is imperative for anthropology as a whole that fieldwork in some form by some people continue. In place of the view of fieldwork as an essential preparation for doing anthropology, an alternative role for it is explored: namely as a testing procedure. The implications of this--that the study of problems and the articulation of theories can usefully proceed prior to or even independently of fieldwork--are drawn out, and a new institution of selective fieldwork is proposed. (shrink)

That a science of human conduct is possible, that what any man may do even in moments of the most sober and careful reflection can be understood and explained, has seemed to many a philosopher to cast doubt upon our common view that any human action can ever be said to be truly free. This book, first published in 1961, into crucially important issues that are often ignored in the familiar arguments for and against the possibility of free action. (...) These issues are brought to light and examined in some detail. (shrink)

Regarding the famous Sea Battle Argument, which Aristotle presents in De Interpretatione 9, there has never been a general agreement not only about its correctness but also, and mainly, about what the argument really is. According to the most natural reading of the chapter, the argument appeals to a temporal concept of truth and concludes that not every statement is always either true or false. However, many of Aristotle’s followers and commentators have not adopted this reading. I believe that (...) it has faced so much resistance for reasons of hermeneutic charity: denying the law of universal bivalence seems to be overly disruptive to logical orthodoxy – the kind of logical orthodoxy represented by what we now call classical propositional logic, much of which Aristotle clearly supports in many texts. I intend to show that the logical-semantic theses that the traditional reading finds in De Interpretatione 9 are much more conservative than they may seem to be at first glance. First, I will show that they complement, and do not contradict in any way, the orthodox definitions of the concepts of truth and statement that Aristotle advances in other texts. Second, by resorting in an anachronistic vein to concepts and methods peculiar to contemporary logic, I will show that a trivalent modal semantics conforming to those theses can be built for a standard formal language of the classical propositional calculus. It is remarkable that reasonable concepts of logical truth and logical consequence that may be defined on the basis of this trivalent modal semantics are coextensive with their orthodox counterparts, the concepts of tautology and tautological consequence of classical bivalent and extensional semantics. (shrink)

Some years ago a collection of historical and philosophical essays on sex was advertised under the slogan: Philosophers are interested in sex again. Since that time the history of sexuality has become an almost unexceptionable topic, occasioning as many books and articles as anyone would ever care to read. Yet there are still fundamental conceptual problems that get passed over imperceptibly when this topic is discussed, passed over, at least in part, because they seem so basic or obvious that it (...) would be time badly spent to worry too much about them. However, without backtracking toweard this set of problems, one will quite literally not know what one is writing the history of when one writes a history of sexuality.An excellent example of some of the most sophisticated current writing in this field can be found in Western Sexuality, a collection of essays that resulted from a seminar conducted by Philippe Ariès at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in 1979-80.1 As one would expect, Western Sexuality is characterized by a diversity of methodological and historiographical approaches—social history, intellectual history, cultural history , historical sociology, the analysis of literary texts, and that distinctive kind of history practiced by Michel Foucault and also in evidence in the short essay by Paul Veyne. One perspective virtually absent from this collection is the history of science, and since I believe that the history of science has a decisive and irreducible contribution to make to the history of sexuality, it is not accident that I am going to focus on that connection. But the history of sexuality is also an area in which one’s historiography or implicit epistemology will stamp, virtually irrevocably, one’s first-order historical writing. It is an arena in which philosophical and historical concerns inevitably run into one another. 1. Philippe Ariès and Adnré Béjin, eds., Western Sexuality: Practice and Percept in Past and Present Times . Arnold I. Davidson, a coeditor of Critical Inquiry, is assistant professor of philosophy and member of the Committees on General Studies in the Humanities and on the Conceptual Foundations of Science at the University of Chicago. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, “How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality,” appeared in the Winter 1987 issue. (shrink)

In debates about genetic testing of children, as well as about disclosing unsolicited findings (UFs) of pediatric exome sequencing, respect for future autonomy should be regarded as a prima facie consideration for not taking steps that would entail denying the future adult the opportunity to decide for herself about what to know about her own genome. While the argument can be overridden when other, morally more weighty considerations are at stake, whether this is the case can only be determined (...) in concrete cases. Importantly, when children grow into adolescents, respect for future autonomy will have to give way to respecting their emerging autonomy. When pediatric exome sequencing is done for complex conditions not involving developmental delay, respect for the child’s future or emerging autonomy should be a primary consideration for those charged with deciding on behalf of the child. Building on what Emanuel and Emanuel have termed the ‘deliberative model’ of shared decision making, we argue that if parents fail to give these considerations their due, professionals should actively invite them to do so. Taking a directive stance may be needed in order to make sure that the future or emerging autonomy of the child are duly considered in the decision-making process, but also to help the parents and themselves to shape their respective roles as responsible care-givers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BROADCAST REVIEW OF HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY[I] K. R. POPPER Translated by I. GRATTAN-GUINNESS B ertrand Russell has written a new book.[2] It is a great work, great in its ideas, great in its inspiration and great in its significance. The title is: A History ofwestern Philosophy, in German, Geschichte der Abendlaendischen Philosophie. The book can well be called unique. In any case, it is the first of its (...) kind. There are many histories of philosophy, multi-volumed and single-volumed, good and bad. But up to now there has not been one written by a really great and original thinker. Most were written by well-trained scholars, but there is a great difference between a scholarly professor of philosophy who writes the history of philosophy, and a man like Russell who is himself a maker of the history of philosophy. Perhaps this explains in part the uniqueness of this book. It is a book that is written with clarity and at the same time with a cheerful ease; a book that ventures, and that can venture, to handle the history of philosophy with humour and with grace. What is special and great in Russell's book? The table of contents is not essentially different from other histories of philosophy. Russell himself describes the special purpose upon which he has settled as follows: he wants to understand each philosopher from his social context, and to explain the philosopher's special philosophy (as far as [' Broadcast over the Austrian Broadcasting Service, 19 Januaty 1947. For the German original, see pp. 11-13. The translation has been checked by Sir Karl Popper.] [2 History of W(stern Philosophy, and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstancesfrom the Earliest Times to the Present Day (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1946). Pp. 916. £1.0.0.] russell: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster University Libraty Press n.s. 12 (summer 1992): '9-2'. 1SSN 0036-01631 20 K. R. POPPER possible) through its social circumstances and the political institutions andproblems ofhis time. But in my view the aim IS hardly the special thing in Russell's book. For nowadays this method can hardly be claimed to be original any more. It is true that Russell is the first to extend this socio-historical method to the entire history of philosophy; and that this allows him to throw new light on many problems-in particular, on problems and forms of philosophy of the early middle ages, for example Augustine and Boethius. But despite the attraction of these problems, I do not believe that the greatness of Russell's book lies in its socio-historical method. What makes the book great is the man who has written it. The book is the man. By that I do not want to say that the book is less objective than other histories of philosophy. On the contrary, other books seek earnestly to be objective, but they never achieve it. What they achieve is only that they seem to be objective, and with that to give a &Ise impression to the reader. Russell does not attempt to be objective. He permits himself to state his opinion simply and openly, and he makes it quite clear that this is his personal opinion-his wellconsidered opinion-but not more; certainly not the judgment ofhistory. In my eyes, Bertrand Russell is without doubt the only man in our time of whom one can say that he is a great philosopher-a philosopher who can be named in the one breath with men like Descartes, John Locke, David Hume, or Immanuel Kant. He is the man whom we thank that philosophy has not entirely lapsed into one of the intolerable fashions of our time, and into charlatanry and wind-baggery. The expressions "charlatanry" and "windbaggery" were deployed by Schopenhauer, who saw these things and fought against them, as did Kant. Until Fichte and Hegel ruined it, philosophy was argumentation. Arguments counted-otherwise nothing. Since Fichte and Hegel philosophy has moved towards spell-weaving. It has given up instructing us, and instead seeks to beguile us, as Schopenhauer said. The trendy philosophers, who beguile us instead of instructing us, found an... (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 3, Page 274-282, March 2022.

In this paper I argue that it is finally time to move beyond the Nagelian framework and to break new ground in thinking about epistemic reduction in biology. I will do so, not by simply repeating all the old objections that have been raised against Ernest Nagel’s classical model of theory reduction. Rather, I grant that a proponent of Nagel’s approach can handle several of these problems but that, nevertheless, Nagel’s general way of thinking about epistemic reduction in terms of (...) theories and their logical relations is entirely inadequate with respect to what is going on in actual biological research practice. (shrink)

Psychiatric patients sometimes ask where to draw the line between who they are – their selves – and their mental illness. This problem is referred to as the self-illness ambiguity in the literature; it has been argued that solving said ambiguity is a crucial part of psychiatric treatment. I distinguish a Realist Solution from a Constructivist one. The former requires finding a supposedly pre-existing border, in the psychiatric patient’s mental life, between that which belongs to the self and that which (...) belongs to the mental illness. I argue that no such border exists, and that attempts to find it might even render the felt ambiguity worse. Instead, any solution must be constructivist; the patient (and others) should deliberate and discuss what to identify with or not. I further argue that psychiatric patients need not see their mental illness as wholly distinct from themselves to avoid ‘identifying with their diagnoses' in a problematic way. Finally, we can excuse problematic behaviour by mentally ill people – in fact, we can do so in a more nuanced and constructive way – while rejecting the view that the mental illness is wholly distinct from the patient’s self. (shrink)

This thesis is a study on the nature of modality in Hegel’s Logic and contemporary modal metaphysics. The thesis has two aims: Firstly, it examines Lewisian modal realism, as well as the post-Lewisian modal metaphysical accounts of modal actualism and modal essentialism in order to reveal that each position appeals to a non-modal foundation to make modal concepts explicit. Each position thus falls under what Hegel regards as pre-critical metaphysics by suggesting a modally unaccountable ground for modal concepts. The (...) very idea of a foundation to modality is problematic because as a foundation, it is necessarily assumed without further justification, and it directs our attention away from the nature of modality itself to its supposed foundations. These non-modal foundational take the form of possible worlds for modal realism, the form of properties for modal actualism and the form of essence for modal essentialism. To eschew foundationalism in modal metaphysics and provide a less questionable basis for modality, the thesis suggests Hegel’s treatment of modality as a viable alternative in virtue of its being free from the concerns stemming from the pre-critical way of doing metaphysics. The thesis situates Hegel in contemporary modal metaphysics by undertaking two types of exposition. By examining Hegel's treatment of essence and property, the thesis will show negatively that essence and property cannot be a foundation for modality, while by examining Hegel’s treatment of modality, the thesis positively proves that modal concepts are analysable and explainable within the domain of actuality, a domain that can only be made explicit by modal determinations. These two expositions provide an idea of a self-sustaining and self-explanatory modal metaphysics without appealing to non-modal foundationalist metaphysical commitments. More precisely, I argue that Hegel’s logical derivation of modal concepts constitutes a Hegelian modal metaphysics, which contains a comprehensive account of modal concepts that does not rely on any non-modal primitive. (shrink)

Open peer commentary on the article “I Can’t Yet and Growth Mindset” by Fiona Murphy & Hugh Gash.: What Murphy and Gash are attempting to do is to solve a significant problem some students have being successful in school, one that is not often addressed in any significant way. The language used to describe the lessons has some significant departures from radical constructivism. It is, no doubt, beneficial that the students in the study may have developed improvements in self-image, (...) but, as seen in other work, the application of radical constructivism to develop and extend the work started in the study could result in more and more lasting improvements. (shrink)

The first poems about the Prophet Muḥammad appeared while he was alive. These first examples, which are panegyrics (madīḥ, i‛tiẕār, fakhr and ris̱ā), largely reflect the characteristics of the pre-Islamic qaṣīda poetry. Due to the developments in the following centuries, the number of poems about the Prophet increased. And thus, a separate literary genre was formed under the name al-madīḥ al-nabawī. Especially the fact that sufi leaning poets contributed to the literary richness in this field. Another factor is the beginning (...) of the tradition of writing mawlid poems in memory of the birth of the Prophet Muḥammad. The thirteenth century was an important period for poems praising the Prophet Muḥammad. Two important poets emerged in this century. One of them is Egyptian poet al-Būṣīrī and the other is Baghdad's famous poet, Yaḥyā al-Ṣarṣarī. Even after his death, Ṣarṣarî’s works with high literary value were read and memorized in the circles of science, literature and Sufism. Due to his competence in the field, al-Ṣarṣarī was known as the poet of the Prophet and Ḥassān b. Thābit of his time. However, it is understood that his poems, which lost their importance in literary circles over time, were not studied as much as they deserved in the modern period. In this article, his life and works are introduced and basic language and stylistic features of his poems are examined. Also, the image of the Prophet in his poems was determined within the framework of the political conditions of the period.Summary: In the field of madīh nabawī, which first appeared in the ‘Asr al-Sa’āda and has continued to the present day, especially two names stand out in the 7th/13th century, when famous poets such as Macduddīn al-Vitrī (d. 662/1264), Ibn al-Muraḥḥal (d. 699/1300) and Ṣafiyyuddīn al-Ḥillī (d. 749/1348) were also raised. One of them is the Egyptian poet al-Būṣīrī (d. 695/1296), who left his mark on the field of madīh nabawī with his many poems, especially Qaṣīda Burda, and the other is the Iraqi poet Yahya al-Ṣarṣarī (d. 656/1258), who was named Shā‘iru Rasūlillāh (The poet of the Prophet) and Ḥassānu Vaḳtihī (Ḥassān of that period) because of the quality of his poems in this field.al-Ṣarṣarī, was born in the village of al-Ṣarṣar, near Baghdad, spent most of his life in the shadow of Baghdad’s political instability and the social collapse that developed in parallel. He was killed in 656/1258 by the Mongolian forces that invaded Baghdad. al-Ṣarṣarī was extremely knowledgeable in fiqh, hadith, language, and ‘ilm al-qirāa. Our poet adopted the views of the Hanbalī law school. In addition, he turned to Sufism and became a murīd (disciple) of Ali ibn Idrīs al-Ya‘kūbī, a student of Abdalqadīr al-Gīlanī who was accepted as the founder of Qādiriyya. He was closely attached to the Sunnah of the Prophet and was fond of reading the Quran. He was chaste and patient and was content with what he had himself. All his works are poetic and they all concern the madīh nabawī or fiqh.Since his poems, almost all of which are about the praise of the Prophet, have a high literary value, they were read, memorized and narrated for a long time in the circles of science, literature and Sufism. In terms of its structure, his poems are based on the traditional forms of Arab qasīda. In the introductory sections of his poems, he often expresses his longing for Madina. The main subject in poems is usually the Prophet and his superior features. In the last part, he usually says salāt for the Prophet and seeks help from him. It can be said that he used simple language in his poems. The vocabulary reflects the characteristics of the urban life in which he lived. The source of inspiration for his poems are the Qur’an and especially the hadith of the Prophet. He uses the potential of literary arts as much as possible while conveying his feelings. But he does not allow the correct information to be lost due to these arts on a serious subject such as depicting the Prophet. We can see a lot of badī‘ (creative) art in some of his poems. But we can immediately understand that these arts do not spoil the beauty of his expression. The poet provides rhythm and harmony in his poetry with the meter and rhyme in accordance with the classical Arabic qasida rules. In addition, he strengthens the musicality in poetry with puns (jinās) and repetition.The influence of the instability of the region where al-Ṣarṣarī lived on his poems is obvious. According to him, the main reason for the terrible situation that Muslims were in was that they were away from the way of the Prophet. He thought that it would be possible to go back to the old peaceful days by following the way of the Prophet. Perhaps as a result of this opinion, he allocated his qasīda to the narration of the Prophet and his Companions. In his poems, he describes the Prophet with his names, superior qualities, physical and moral characteristics. He says that the sentences describing the Prophet are the ornament of poems and believes that praising him is a mean of salvation in the next world. He also hoped that the poems he said in order to achieve spiritual ascension would protect himself against the troubled events of the period.In his poems, especially on the occasion of mawlīd, al-Ṣarṣarī mentions the Prophet’s physical characteristics and likens his smiling face to a bright full moon, his brows to the letter nûn, his teeth to pearls. He describes the Prophet as a man with black eyes, broad shoulders, born with kohl-lined eyes, and who emanates a beautiful scent as a requirement of his creation. The poet, who also touches on the Prophet’s powerful address, states that his speech is more effective than Luqman’s wise words by virtue of his jawami‘ al-kalim (comprehensive speech) and faṣl al-khiṭab (clear speech), and that his soft address, which states nothing other than the truth, is a blessing from Allah. He additionally describes the Prophet’s plain words, easy to understand by all, as more valuable than jewels. al-Ṣarṣarī, who praises the Prophet in terms of morality with basic human virtues such as bashfulness, justice, modesty, and courage, emphasizes that he is, a paragon of patience, perseverance, kindness, and compassion through analogies such as, “his clothes are peace and perseverance”, his “cover is kindness and forgiveness”. In his world of imagery, the Prophet’s benevolence is so abundant like the rain that the clouds cannot compete with him. Also, he does not shame anybody for what he gives. He bestows the most valuable possessions like gold and camels. Even the respectable personalities of the tribe benefit from his grace. He is so generous that he is giving even when the clouds are stingy about giving rain during times of drought. He welcomes with a smile those who approach him with requests. The donations he makes privately are entirely satisfying.The image of prophethood in al-Ṣarṣarī’s poems, is centralized around the thought of nūr Muhammadī (prophetic light) and the miracles of the Prophet. He reminds that the Prophet never gave up despite the calamities he encountered and that he was supported with extraordinary events in various stages of his life since he was born, and reflects the understanding that the prophet is spiritually supporting the community with his nūr, and in the case the community follow his sunnah, overcoming the Mongolian attacks, which seems like a miracle, is possible. The mention of Qattāl (warrior), Māḥī (eliminator of disbelief), Ẓāhir, Ẓāfir, Manṣūr and Muẓaffar (victorious) among the Prophet’s names, especially those that evoke the superiority he gained in his fight against the disbelievers, giving greater prominence to his courage and valor among his virtues are also related to the political and social conditions of the period. The couplets about the Companions of the Prophet following the couplets that describe the Prophet’s valor, the emphasis of their aid to the Prophet, and the particular mention of their fighter spirit may be considered in the same context. Perhaps, in this way, the poet aims to boost the courage of the Muslims who are exposed to Mongolian attacks with respect to protecting their spiritual and holy values against the enemy. (shrink)

What makes a policy work? What should policies attempt to do, and what ought they not do? These questions are at the heart of both policy-making and ethics. Philosophy, Ethics and Public Policy: An Introduction examines these questions and more. Andrew I. Cohen uses contemporary examples and controversies, mainly drawn from policy in a North American context, to illustrate important flashpoints in ethics and public policy, such as: public policy and globalization: sweatshops; medicine and the developing world; (...) immigration marriage, family and education: same-sex marriage; women and the family; education and Intelligent Design justifying and responding to state coercion: torture; reparations and restorative justice the ethics of the body and commodification: the human organ trade, and factory farming of animals. Each chapter illustrates how ethics offers ways of prioritizing some policy alternatives and imagining new ones. Reflecting on various themes in globalization, markets, and privacy, the chapters are windows to enduring significant debates about what states may do to shape our behavior. Overall, the book will help readers understand how ethics can frame policymaking, while also suggesting that sometimes the best policy is no policy. Including annotated further reading, this is an excellent introduction to a fast-growing subject for students in Philosophy, Public Policy, and related disciplines. (shrink)

Mushkil al-Qur’ān is a science of the Qur’ān in which the verses that are considered contradictory at first glance and what ways/methods are used in reconciling them. From the point of view of a commentator or even a believer, the ishkal (contradiction) cannot be attributed to the Qur’ān proper, and the supposed contradictions between verses do not appear in the Qur’ān but the mind of the subject. Therefore, in this science, it can be seen that both the recognition of (...) contradictions and the elimination of contradictions are related to the interpretive context of the tafsīr methodology. This science has emerged on a dynamic ground and has a characteristic feature that determines the interpreter’s ability to interpret. The aspect of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān that distinguishes it from other Qurʾānic Sciences relates to the practical dimension of the tafsīr rather than general determinations and statistical information about the Qur’ān. For this reason, the scope of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān may change depending on the time, culture, perspective of the commentator, knowledge, and school preferences. The fact that disciplines define the concept of mushkil in different ways, and the change in the scope of the subject in the independent works written in the early period and the Qurʾānic Sciences literature written after al-Zarkashī requires a terminological-chronological-methodological analysis of the nature and content of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān scholarship. With its pre-Zarkashī structure, Mushkil al-Qur’ān science differs from its structure that emerged in the later period, both in terms of its target audience and its content. If we look at the works of names such as Ibn Qutaybah, it becomes clear that this science is mandated to cater to the religionless. However, especially with the scope and methods in which it has been dealt with in the recent period, the Mushkil al-Qur’ān is based on the internal dynamics of the shari'a sciences. Therefore, it can be said that al-Zarkashī defined the science of Mushkil al-Qur’ān, which had a comprehensive content in the early period, with a different name and a narrowing of its content as a field fed by the internal dynamics of the tafsīr, and that this science acquired a unified form after al-Suyūṭī. This process brought about some changes in the subject matter and content of the science of the Mushkil al-Qur'ān. For the Mushkil al-Qur’ān, which in the early days had the purpose of answering the doubts and objections of the deniers of the Qur’ān, developed after al-Zarkashī into a field mainly concerned with removing the difficulties of understanding. Within this framework, the methods and classifications presented in this science with the structure defined by al-Zarkashī are the products of the effort to make sense of the Word of God. The systematization of this effort to make sense under the umbrella of shāri‘ sciences in a terminological and theoretical framework opens the science of Mushkil al-Qur'ān to the fields of kalam and fiqh/method. In the works written on Mushkil al-Qur’ān and in the literature on fiqh, the reasons for the contradictions between the verses and the ways to eliminate them are given. What these ways depend on the context in which the contradiction is dealt with. Those who treat the contradiction in a way that includes the ambiguities in the words while eliminating these ambiguities resort to other pieces of evidence such as narratives, style of expression/context, truth metaphor, reason, analogy, and custom. In case of an apparent contradiction, methods like cem‘ (gathering), preference, naskh, renunciation are used. Despite the differences in the school’s preferences as to which of these methods was used first in the classical period, there is almost a consensus as to the ways followed in eliminating contradictions between verses. In the modern period, some scholars claim that one of these methods, abrogation, is directly related to the Mushkil al-Qur’ān, and they explain that naskh is applied when the contradictions between the verses cannot be interpreted. This assertion, made in modern times, that naskh is a method that scholars resort to when they cannot remove the impression of contradictions between verses, is closely related to the definition, essence, and content of the Mushkil al-Qur’ān. In this context, it is crucial where the ways/methods used to follow the nature-content pendulum while eliminating the counterparts of the terms and the impressions of contradiction. This is because the acceptance of naskh as a contradiction solution stems from the fact that it is one of the ways to prove that there is no contradiction in the Qur’ān from the perspective of fiqh, and naskh means that two contradictory provisions were valid at different times. The contradiction arises when it is claimed that these two provisions are valid at the same time. (shrink)

Background: There is evidence that household point-of-use water treatment products can reduce the enormous burden of water-borne illness. Nevertheless, adoption among the global poor is very low, and little evidence exists on why. Methods: We gave 600 households in poor communities in Dhaka, Bangladesh randomly-ordered two-month free trials of four water treatment products: dilute liquid chlorine, sodium dichloroisocyanurate tablets, a combined flocculant-disinfectant powdered mixture, and a silver-coated ceramic siphon filter. Consumers also received education on the dangers of untreated drinking water. (...) We measured which products consumers used with self-reports, observation, and chlorine tests. We also measured drinking water's contamination with E. coli. Findings: Households reported highest usage of the filter, although no product had even 30% usage. E. coli concentrations in stored drinking water were generally lowest when households had Water Guard. Households that self-reported product usage had large reductions in E. coli concentrations with any product as compared to controls. Conclusion: Traditional arguments for the low adoption of POU products focus on affordability, consumers' lack of information about germs and the dangers of unsafe water, and specific products not meshing with a household's preferences. In this study we provided free trials, repeated informational messages explaining the dangers of untreated water, and a variety of product designs. The low usage of all products despite such efforts makes clear that important barriers exist beyond cost, information, and variation among these four product designs. Without a better understanding of the choices and aspirations of the target end-users, household-based water treatment is unlikely to reduce morbidity and mortality substantially in urban Bangladesh and similar populations. © 2011 Luoto et al. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:45. HUME'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE SELF One of the more baffling and apparently inconclusive parts of the Treatise is the section on personal identity. Hume himself, when he takes a backward glance at it in those notorious passages in the Appendix, singles it out as representing an unresolved problem in his philosophy. It is a matter of fairly general agreement among recent writers on the subject that one of (...) Hume's chief difficulties -- though not one he recognizes — is his assigning to the mind (or, sometimes, the "imagination") certain activities, which he claims are instrumental in generating belief in, and awareness of, the very mind or self whose activities they are said to be. Hume talks about customs and habits of the mind and the expectations arising out of these, of the acts of observing, noticing and associating, of believing, of feigning, and so on, acts which the mind is required to perform in order for us to be able to explain along acceptable empiricist lines how the idea of an abiding self arises. Such talk, it seems, already presupposes the existence of a self and our possession of the idea thereof. So does, of course, the talk involved in Hume's accounts of the external world and of causality. Insofar as these involve his theory of belief, they, too, seem to presuppose a self which is more than a fiction, more than a product of the imagination. Yet the account he gives of the self seems to yield precisely a fiction in just the sense in which our ideas of the external world and of its causal connections are ideas of fictions. Quite generally, then, if Hume's theory of belief presupposes a continually existing self, what sense can be made of his arguments to show that our belief in such a self is the belief in a fiction? I want to argue that Hume can be defended against such criticisms and that the appearance of circularity here is just that: an appearance. It results largely from 46. two features of the Treatise. The first is that since at different points in the Treatise Hume is obviously concerned with different problems, his language reflects this. It is for this reason only that at times he talks in ways which make it seem that a continually existing self is being presupposed. The second feature responsible for the appearance of circularity is that while Hume draws a distinction between "perfect" and 'imperfect" identity, he fails to make that distinction explicit enough, so that one may easily miss the all-important point that it is only the former sort of identity which is being denied of the self, and the latter sort which is being explained and accounted for along Humean empiricist lines. If we keep this in mind, we shall see that the references in his account of the identity of the self to the activities of the self are not questionbegging, and that the attribution of these activities to the very same "fiction" whose existence is being accounted for carries no absurdity. II One way to bring out the differences between the kind of self which is alleged to be presupposed by Hume's account and that which, as I shall argue, is really involved in that account, is to put pressure on Hume's doctrine of 2 association. It is frequently urged by commentators that the notion of association which is so fundamental for much of Hume's philosophy is ambiguous, showing as it does the influence of two very different models, deriving from Hutcheson and Newton respectively. On the first model, a continuing self is presupposed as the agent of the various sorts of associative acts he invokes; on the second it is the items associated (perceptions) which are themselves the entities doing the associating. Clearly, the question whether Hume's theory of belief involves the assumption that a continuing self exists (harmless in the uses of that 47. theory in other contexts, but possibly fatal in its use in a theory of personal identity) may be seen to resolve into the question, which model of association is fundamental for Hume? It is, of course, an undeniable... (shrink)

“There is, in addition, a second reason for doubting that scientists reject paradigms because confronted with anomalies or counterinstances. In developing it my argument will itself foreshadow another of this essay's main theses. The reasons for doubt sketched above were purely factual; they were, that is, themselves counterinstances to a prevalent epistemological theory. As such, if my present point is correct, they can at best help to create a crisis or, more accurately, to reinforce one that is already very much (...) in existence. By themselves they cannot and will not falsify that philosophical theory, for its defenders will do what we have already seen scientists doing when confronted by anomaly. They will devise numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory in order to eliminate any apparent conflict. Many of the relevant modifications and qualifications are, in fact, already in the literature. If, therefore, these epistemological counterinstances are to constitute more than a minor irritant, that will be because they help to permit the emergence of a new and different analysis of science within which they are no longer a source of trouble. Furthermore, if a typical pattern, which we shall later observe in scientific revolutions, is applicable here, these anomalies will then no longer seem to be simply facts. From within a new theory of scientific knowledge, they may instead seem very much like tautologies, statements of situations that could not conceivably have been otherwise.”. (shrink)

The question of what is truly just in the matter of a country's currently established human-rights interpretations appears not to be the same as the question of what it is morally right to do by way of coercively effectuating a given set of such interpretations. There are grounds for contending that acts of support for a coercive political regime can be justified morally on the condition that the regime's prevailing human-rights interpretations are made continuously available to effective, democratic (...) critical re-examination. However, it is not possible ever finally to know whether that condition is satisfied. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This paper is about the problem of the moral responsibility resting on any person to form rational beliefs about, and moral attitudes towards, the deterrent threat of mutual assured destruction (MAD), which still lies behind the graduated nuclear response strategies now more fashionably discussed by military experts. The problem is to decide what kinds of reasons there are, and how to arrive in the light of them at determinate conclusions about deterrence and unilateral disarmament. Consequential arguments would be (...) powerful, if only they were determinate; but not only do they not point conclusively to one strategy rather than another, there is not even sufficient reason for accepting one rather than another of the competing optimising criteria by which the strategies might be assessed. So the reasons of other kinds against forming a conditional intention to retaliate with a massive second strike could be conclusive, if retaliation itself could do no (consequential) good, and if, as is claimed, the conditional intention could not be simulated. To form such an intention is held to be contrary to core values of a humane, rationalist culture. To assent to a nuclear retaliatory strike would do violence to the moral nature of anyone participating in such a culture, and to form an intention to make (or condone) such a strike would be a corruption of such a nature. So too would condoning the fostering of such an intention in others, as a way of making the retaliatory intention credible. The author accordingly considers this argument against MAD, and for unilateral nuclear disarmament, sufficient, given the inadequacy of the consequential arguments, while acknowledging that this might involve great sacrifice. The paper concludes, however, by considering whether anyone can reject nuclear deterrence who also believes that resistance to Nazism in 1939 was justified, given the then prevailing belief that the war might be massively destructive. The author holds that there is no inconsistency in both supporting resistance to evil, even at risk of total destruction, and in refusing to form or condone a conditional intention to do equivalent but pointless evil in order to make a threat credible. (shrink)

Much is known about the antecedents and outcomes of procrastination when comparing students to one another. However, little is known about the antecedents and outcomes of procrastination when comparing the courses taken by the students during a semester. In this study, we proposed that examining procrastination at both levels of analysis should improve our understanding of the academic experience of students. At both levels, we examined the mediating role of procrastination in the associations between two dimensions of motivation and indicators (...) of academic achievement and well-being. A sample of 359 university students completed questionnaires measuring their motivation, procrastination, and affect in each of their courses. The official final course grades were obtained at the end of the semester. Multilevel mediation analyses with structural equation modeling were conducted to test our hypotheses. At the between-person level, the indirect effects revealed that higher controlled motivation was significantly associated with worse outcomes via higher levels of procrastination. At the within-person level, the indirect effects revealed that lower autonomous motivation was significantly associated with worse outcomes via higher levels of procrastination. Overall, this study shows that different pathways at each level of analysis may explain how procrastination can be detrimental for the success and well-being of university students. (shrink)

Saul Smilansky’s theory of free will and moral responsibility consists of two parts; dualism and illusionism. Dualism is the thesis that both compatibilism and hard determinism are partly true, and has puzzled many philosophers. I argue that Smilansky’s dualism can be given an unquestionably coherent and comprehensible interpretation if we reformulate it in terms of pro tanto reasons. Dualism so understood is the thesis that respect for persons gives us pro tanto reasons to blame wrongdoers, and also pro tanto reasons (...) not to blame them. These reasons must be we ighed against each other (and against relevant consequentialist reasons) in order to find out what we all things considered ought to do. (shrink)

In multiple essays, CLR James lays out what a theory of subjectivity must account for to resolve issues stemming from reducing subjectivity to a singular identity. Most proposals for a theory of subjectivity do so by making the subject the object of another’s propositions or claims about the world. I argue that this is an identity claim. The converse of this process is also true, that the subject who claims another as the object of their proposition must also be (...) the object of a proposition themselves, leaving the capacity to form these expressions untouched. In Black Cultural studies, there has been a lot of attention paid to the capacity for one to become the object of their own propositions due to the conception that Black identity overdetermines Black subjects’ expressions prior to their articulation. Our reorientation to the study of subjectivity posits an entity whose operation functions to mobilise as well as implement identity claims. Subjectivity is a capacity while identity becomes the object of that capacity, an object shared between subjects that are known by becoming the object of propositions regarding the world, including their own. This essay attempts to resolve the conflicts that arise once the mistake of conflating subjectivity with identity claims is made and proposes a model whereby the concept of Black subjectivity can be explained. (shrink)

Despite the growing body of work exploring the weaknesses of police performance systems and the displacement of their goals, less attention has been given to why police officers resist and circumvent by false reporting. Whether police report honestly on their activities is a matter of considerable significance given the role that police have in a broadly democratic society, and the overall question is whether the false reporting undermines the integrity of the police or if it is a collective coping strategy (...) that safeguards the police ethos? This survey reveals that 25% of respondents (n = 2248) had manipulated the numbers at least once in the previous year. To identify why they did so, the variables selected for analysis are those determining their view of the Management by Objective (MBO) system, how far they have participated in the MBO process and how often they are unable to assist a member of the public. Our results show that men are more likely to manipulate the numbers than women and non-leaders are more likely to do so than leaders. Respondents were more likely to submit false reports if they had not participated in the MBO process, were not motivated by MBO goals, believed the MBO indicators misdirected their focus and frequently felt that they were forced to reject members of the public they would like to help. Our findings further show that public servants can be corrupted, though they do not “bring” vices to work with them, but rather acquire vices through what is required of them. (shrink)

From the older handbooks to the more recent scholarly literature, Gorgias's professions about his art are taken literally at their word: conjured up in all of these accounts is the image of a hearer irresistibly overwhelmed by Gorgias's apagogic and psychagogic persuasions. Gorgias's own description of his art, in effect, replaces our description of it. "His proofs... give the impression of ineluctability" . "Thus logos is almost an independent external power which forces the hearer to do its will" . "Incurably (...) deceptive," logos has an "enormous power" that acts upon opinion, which is "easy to change" . Surprisingly, the urge to describe or paraphrase Gorgias's art has caused commentators to overlook the very best witness of it that we have: its enactment, which is to say the performative value of Gorgias's writings, especially the speeches. For if Gorgias's literary remains do nothing else, they demonstrate how one can do things with words without being explicit about what is being done, even if this means contradicting, performatively, what is being said-as for instance in his statements, so unconvincingly made, about the ostensible aims of rhetoric. Was Gorgias persuasive in practice? Was persuasion even the goal? Is logos the solitary arbiter of reality that it is so often made out to be? Through close examination of Gorgias's Helen and parts of On Not-Being, I attempt to show that persuasion is manifestly not the goal of his arguments, which in the first instance are aporetic paradoxes that expose the difficulties of defining the nature of either language or reality, and which in the last instance are instruments of cultural demystification. The only deception at work in Gorgias's writings is that of the self-deception of their audience. It is this that gives these curiously revealing documents of fifth-century Greek culture their "dissuasive," not persuasive, character. (shrink)

Do perceiving subjects represent kind properties in the content of their conscious visual experience when they see and recognize instances of those natural kinds? In Part 1 of my thesis I clarify this question, in Part 2 I answer it, and in Part 3 I raise a problem for previous answers. Part 1 conceives of conscious experience in an internalist way, and the unified conscious episode does not exclude having beliefs about what one sees. Following Siegel and Bayne, Part (...) 2 formulates two arguments in support of representing kind properties in the content of experience. In Part 3, I argue that attempts to distinguish visual experiences from visual beliefs might fail to account for the interplay of sensory and cognitive elements in visual object recognition. I conclude by suggesting it has not been established that visual experiences can be distinguished from visual beliefs. (shrink)

Cosmology is usually understood as an observational science, where experimentation plays no role. It is interesting, nevertheless, to change this perspective addressing the following question: what should we do to create a universe, in a laboratory? It appears, in fact, that this is, in principle, possible according to at least two different paradigms; both allow to circumvent singularity theorems, i.e. the necessity of singularities in the past of inflating domains which have the required properties to generate a universe similar (...) to ours. The first of them is substantially classical, and is built up considering solitons which collide with surrounding topological defects, generating an inflationary domain of space–time. The second is, instead, partly quantum and considers the possibility of tunnelling of past-non-singular regions of spacetime into an inflating universe, following a well-known instanton proposal. We are, here, going to review some of these models, as well as highlight possible extensions, generalizations and the open issues (as for instance the detectability of child universes and the properties of quantum tunnelling processes) that still affect the description of their dynamics. In doing so we will remark how the works on this subject can represent virtual laboratories to test the role that fundamental principles of physics (particularly, the interplay of quantum and general relativistic realms) played in the formation of our universe. (shrink)

Change is endemic in nature yet scientists seek stability amidst change. When proposals fail scientists shift their focus and look for stability elsewhere. Scholars who study the development of science also seek stability in the scientific process. Here I explore the interaction between stability and change in nature as we understand it through the sciences and in the practice of scientific research. The concluding part argues that the search for stability meets a human intellectual need but this is compatible with (...) our finding what is actually there. Cases in which a previously accepted part of science is rejected or revised in response to contrary data indicates that we do not predetermine outcomes of observations and experiments. Still, the belief that there are loci of stability in nature is a working hypothesis. While it has been fruitful, only future scientific developments can determine if this will continue to hold. (shrink)

In the early 1970s, the major industrial states were preparing to shift to nuclear fission as their principal source of electrical power. But that change has not occurred. In part, this is due to a growing public recognition that techniques and institutions for management of spent nuclear fuel, separated plutonium, and long-lived radioactive wastes are not yet fully developed. The consequent pressures for resolution have spurred a series of often ill-defined and sometimes contradictory attempts to promote international cooperation and control (...) of hazardous activities. How are these varied suggestions to be compared and evaluated? By what criteria can plans be selected that are likely to be both effective and negotiable? In this study, Gene I. Rochlin, physicist and social scientist, explores the technical, political, and institutional aspects of international nuclear export and fuel cycle policies. He categorizes existing proposals and suggests way to develop new ones that better promote both national and international goals. Dr. Rochlin argues neither for nor against the use of nuclear power or plutonium fuels. Instead, he addresses the question of how international arrangements could be reached that might jointly satisfy the objective of the several key nations, yet not be too difficult to negotiate. He concludes that a major fault has been the tendency to improvise arrangements for specific technical or industrial operations. As a result, overall social and political goals have become the bargaining points for compromise. Yet attempts to simultaneously resolve all problems are unlikely to prove fruitful. Dr. Rochlin suggests instead the formation of institutions organized around more limited social, political, and technical objectives, even at the expense of excluding some nations or omitting some aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle. Only by so doing, he argues, can immediate agreements be reached that preserve the potential for more comprehensive future arrangements without sacrificing industrial, environmental, or nonproliferation goals. This important book will be of interest to scientists, social scientists, government officials, and others concerned with the problems of plutonium management and nuclear wastes. (shrink)

This book does not demand continuous reading; but at whatever place one opens it, one will find matter for reflection. The most useful books are those of which readers themselves compose half; they extend the thoughts of which the germ is presented to them; they correct what seems defective to them, and they fortify by their reflections what seems to them weak. It is only really by enlightened people that this book can be read; the ordinary man is (...) not made for such knowledge; philosophy will never be his lot. Those who say that there are truths which must be hidden from the people, need not be alarmed; the people do not read; they work six days of the week, and on the seventh go to the inn. In a word, philosophical works are made only for philosophers, and every honest man must try to be a philosopher, without pluming himself on being one. This alphabet is extracted from the most estimable works which are not commonly within the reach of the many; and if the author does not always mention the sources of his information, as being well enough known to the learned, he must not be suspected of wishing to take the credit for other people's work, because he himself preserves anonymity。. (shrink)

The development of the social sciences needs to rely on precise methods. The nomological model of explanation adopted in the natural sciences is ill-suited for the social sciences. An algorithmic model of society can be a promising solution to existing problems. In its most general form, an algorithm is a generally understood prescription for what actions to perform and in what order to achieve the desired result. Any algorithm can be represented as a set of rules of the (...) form «If A, do D to get P». People are the bearers of this kind of rules that apply in different areas of their activities. The rules are subject to change based on personal and collective experience. There is a special mathematical discipline that studies the laws of evolution of such rules. This discipline is called genetic programming. Contrary to the threatening name, the algorithmic model does not imply the deprivation of a person’s right to free choice, but it needs this right as a necessary condition for the evolution of social algorithms. These algorithms allow us to give a non-causal, but law-like explanation of many well-known social phenomena, as well as to effectively model the future, which is critically important today. A retrospective look at the evolution of social algorithms shows that the current global crisis of human society is associated with the approach to the point of singularity in their evolution. This is due to the fact that there is no need for direct human participation in the implementation of social algorithms, which is reflected in a fundamental change in the sphere of employment and less need for further development of the sciences. (shrink)

Contractarianism is more inclusive than critics (and, indeed, Gauthier) sometimes suggest. Contractarianism can justify equal moral standing for human persons (in some respects) and provide sufficient moral standing for many nonhuman animals to require what we commonly call decent treatment. Moreover, contractarianism may allow that some entities have more moral standing than others do. This does not necessarily license the oppression that liberal egalitarians rightly fear. Instead, it shows that contractarianism may support a nuanced account of moral status.